Lincoln's despair
Kevin Levin has yet another interesting entry on his blog, this one exerpting remarks made by renowned Civil War historian Edward Ayers at LeHigh University. The post can be found here.
Professor Ayers is an absolutely first-rate scholar, one of the very best Civil War historians around. But I'm afraid I would have to gently disagree with his observation that Lincoln "considered his re-election a lost cause and therefore felt free to make bold decisions and take daring actions despite being aware of the massive consequences of doing so. The boldest of these actions was the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation."
At what point did Lincoln think his re-election was a "lost cause"? Perhaps Professor Ayers is referring to the following letter he wrote in August 1864:
"This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the President elect, as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such ground that he can not possibly save it afterwards. A. LINCOLN"
Lincoln sealed this letter, then had his cabinet members each in turn endorse it without revealing the contents.
This is the only reliable source I've seen for Lincoln's despair over his chances of re-election, and it came well after issuance of the Proclamation. And personally, I've always seen it as a bit of an aberration--a late and final manifestation of Lincoln's melancholy, and not at all characteristic of his attitude generally during this time. It was, after all, two years removed from his "bottom is out of the tub" remarks to Montgomery Meigs. By 1864 his mood swings appear to have become rather rare.
On the other hand, did Lincoln act without regard for the political future when he issued the Proclamation? Here I think Professor Ayers raises a very interesting and valid point. You could make a pretty good argument that the Emancipation Proclamation is the most politically bold--even reckless--action ever taken by an American president. He had every reason to worry, for such an order given at such a time in American history had the great potential to cost Lincoln not only the presidency, but the war and the nation itself. Few others in his position would have done such a thing.
Why did he do it, then? Of course, much ink has been spilled on the subject. Moral conviction (White, Guelzo, Goodwin), divine inspiration (any number of very early biographers) shrewd and careful political calculation (Donald, McPherson), a racist desire to get a lot of black men killed and advance an entirely different agenda (Bennett, DiLorenzo, and others of their questionable ilk).
But I've always had the sense that there is something deeper here worth investigating, something deeper than politics, or even moral courage. When it came right down to it, the risk was simply incalculable, and unprecedented. And, in its way, out of character. Lincoln was a man who liked compromise, negotiation, and moving carefully around rather than through a problem. But here, at this supreme moment, he pushed forward and through a problem with breathtaking boldness. Where exactly did that come from?
It's an issue I plan to address in my new project on Lincoln and race. For now, I'm simply speculating, and wondering.
Professor Ayers is an absolutely first-rate scholar, one of the very best Civil War historians around. But I'm afraid I would have to gently disagree with his observation that Lincoln "considered his re-election a lost cause and therefore felt free to make bold decisions and take daring actions despite being aware of the massive consequences of doing so. The boldest of these actions was the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation."
At what point did Lincoln think his re-election was a "lost cause"? Perhaps Professor Ayers is referring to the following letter he wrote in August 1864:
"This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the President elect, as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such ground that he can not possibly save it afterwards. A. LINCOLN"
Lincoln sealed this letter, then had his cabinet members each in turn endorse it without revealing the contents.
This is the only reliable source I've seen for Lincoln's despair over his chances of re-election, and it came well after issuance of the Proclamation. And personally, I've always seen it as a bit of an aberration--a late and final manifestation of Lincoln's melancholy, and not at all characteristic of his attitude generally during this time. It was, after all, two years removed from his "bottom is out of the tub" remarks to Montgomery Meigs. By 1864 his mood swings appear to have become rather rare.
On the other hand, did Lincoln act without regard for the political future when he issued the Proclamation? Here I think Professor Ayers raises a very interesting and valid point. You could make a pretty good argument that the Emancipation Proclamation is the most politically bold--even reckless--action ever taken by an American president. He had every reason to worry, for such an order given at such a time in American history had the great potential to cost Lincoln not only the presidency, but the war and the nation itself. Few others in his position would have done such a thing.
Why did he do it, then? Of course, much ink has been spilled on the subject. Moral conviction (White, Guelzo, Goodwin), divine inspiration (any number of very early biographers) shrewd and careful political calculation (Donald, McPherson), a racist desire to get a lot of black men killed and advance an entirely different agenda (Bennett, DiLorenzo, and others of their questionable ilk).
But I've always had the sense that there is something deeper here worth investigating, something deeper than politics, or even moral courage. When it came right down to it, the risk was simply incalculable, and unprecedented. And, in its way, out of character. Lincoln was a man who liked compromise, negotiation, and moving carefully around rather than through a problem. But here, at this supreme moment, he pushed forward and through a problem with breathtaking boldness. Where exactly did that come from?
It's an issue I plan to address in my new project on Lincoln and race. For now, I'm simply speculating, and wondering.
posted by brdirck at 2:41 AM
2 Comments:
I'm no Lincoln expert, but this issue confounds me. At least from the perspective that Lincoln scholars seem unwilling to admit or explain the obvious connection between the 2d Confiscation Act and Lincolns willingness to execute an instrument of the law granted him by the Congress.
Isn't the gist of the EP contained in the CA? Isn't Lincoln's epiphany as a national politician (1854) motivated by a Clay likened conviction that sectionalism is destroying the nation?
So why is it so illogical that Lincoln is motivated to finally use the fulcrum of a Republican Party willingness to end slavery to act when the Congress gives him the instrument to do so?
The EP really is a logical compromise. It only kills slavery in the slaveholding regions in rebellion. It's contigent and grants "loyal" slaveholders the same rights of property ante bellum.
The 'real" radicalism comes post reelection, when Lincoln determines to end the contradiction of state sanction slavery and makes passage of the 13th Ammendment an absolute condition for reestablishing peace in the nation.
I left a comment about "Team of Rivals" before. I have another observation about Goodwin's book. I have a strong sense that Lincoln grew into the job. One gets the sense from Goodwin's book that Lincoln seemed to know from the moment of his inauguration how to be President. This makes no sense to me when you consider that he had no experience whatsoever in the executive branch as a Cabinet officer. He had little experience in Washington besides his two years in Congress. I strongly feel that he grew into the job and Goodwin's book does not address this at all.
Naim
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